Russia’s “Shadow Aviation” Network Is Keeping Sanctions From Grounding Its Airlines
Western sanctions were supposed to cripple Russia’s aviation sector after the invasion of Ukraine.
Instead, Russian airlines are still flying almost as many Airbus and Boeing aircraft as they did before the war — thanks to an increasingly sophisticated global network of intermediaries, shell companies and sanctions-avoidance routes stretching from India to the UAE and Central Asia.
A major Bloomberg investigation reveals how aircraft engines, spare parts and technical equipment continue finding their way into Russia despite strict Western restrictions. The report exposes the hidden mechanisms allowing Moscow to sustain its civil aviation industry, while raising serious questions about the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement and the emergence of a parallel “shadow supply chain” for critical aviation infrastructure.
In late 2024, an aircraft-parts trader in Luxembourg organized what appeared to be a pair of routine transactions, selling two secondhand jet engines stored in Canada to a buyer in India.
But unbeknownst to Vallair Asset Solutions S.a.r.l., the machines traveled on to a Russian airline covered by a blanket of international sanctions. The murky voyage halfway around the globe was orchestrated by a former navy commodore who runs an import-export firm in Kochi, a waterfront city in southwest India. VAS says it was duped.
The subterfuge is emblematic of the ways Russian airlines are circumventing efforts to bring them to their knees. Sanctions by the US, European Union and UK were expected to hamstring domestic airlines by starving them of spare parts and repair expertise, eventually forcing them to start grounding their fleets.
That script isn’t playing out as written. The number of Airbus SE and Boeing Co. jets flown by Russian carriers has seen only a minimal decline since 2023. Airlines are carrying almost as many passengers and scheduling as many seats as they did in 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine. That’s being driven by a strong domestic market.
Trade data compiled from several sources shows aviation equipment moving into Russia via India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan, among others. Some spare parts were tracked by serial numbers as they journeyed from Western suppliers to intermediaries to Russian companies.
Bloomberg News contacted parties involved in such deals, and several said they would no longer do business with each other or with Russia.
Behind some of the transactions is Marine Equipments Centre Pvt. Ltd. in Kochi, a minnow in the world of spare parts trading that nevertheless enjoyed a small but steady stream of business. Through an intermediary, the company purchased two CFM International Inc. engines for about $17 million from VAS and had them shipped from Canada.
The purchase contracts included clauses specifying no re-exports to Russia, according to the documents reviewed by Bloomberg News. Yet within two months of the engines’ arrivals in India, MEC resold them to Rossiya Airlines JSC, one of Russia’s biggest carriers, for about $24 million. The parts are designed for Airbus A320 planes.
Through these deals, MEC and middleman Aman Aviation & Aerospace Solutions Pvt. Ltd. may have put the Western companies involved at risk for civil or criminal penalties. Even suppliers who say they have no knowledge of their products being sold to Russian entities potentially can be held responsible since, under the sanctions, ignorance isn’t necessarily a defense.
“Everyone winds up with egg on their face when something like this happens,” said David Tannenbaum, director at Blackstone Compliance Services, a sanctions and anti-money laundering consultant in Bethesda, Maryland. “This is very much the cat-and-mouse game that happens.”
The resilience of the Russian civil aviation industry is fortified by an under-the-radar, sanctions-skirting network used to procure essential parts — either through traders in friendly nations or front companies Moscow set up abroad to do business. It’s a well-worn page in Russia’s sanctions-busting playbook, calling to mind the “dark fleet” of tankers secretly assembled to smuggle the nation’s illicit oil overseas.
“There is definitely sanctions evasion through third countries and alternative suppliers,” said Alexandr Burilkov, a researcher of Russian policy at Leuphana University Lueneburg in Germany. “The main purpose of that is to keep specific aircraft models — Boeing and Airbus — functional for as long as possible.”
The transactions involve airplane engines, power units, landing gear shock absorbers, a multifunction control and display unit, and even espresso makers for the galley. At least some of these parts came from Western suppliers.
The success of these labyrinthine workarounds, sometimes involving “one-day companies,” prompts questions about the effectiveness — and enforcement — of trade measures designed to paralyze Russia’s economy.
“The Russians, as ever, they’re very adaptable,” said Fiona Hill, who worked for three US presidents and is now a senior fellow for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington. “They’re using all kinds of other relationships with countries that are not sanctioned.”
The numbers back up her point. The nation’s airline sector likely surpassed $30 billion in value last year, representing about 17% growth from the year before, according to estimates from GlobalData Plc, a London-based research firm. Part of that was due to government subsidies.
Russian airlines offered a total of 122 million-plus scheduled seats to destinations at home and abroad — roughly the same as in 2021. Flag carrier Aeroflot PJSC generated its most revenue since at least 2000, reaching 902.3 billion rubles ($11 billion), according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
“All predictions that Russian aircraft would be grounded within two to three months after sanctions were imposed were based on an incorrect assessment of the situation,” Oleksandr Laneckij, director of Vilnius, Lithuania-based aviation consultancy Friendly Avia Support UAB, said in an email.
Using information provided by Big Trade Data, Bloomberg News identified at least 30 companies that exported aircraft-specific parts to Russia last year. This is likely a significant undercount since many countries don’t report transaction-level data and, if they do, it’s often incomplete. Russia stopped disclosing detailed trade data last year.
While many of these import-export firms are in countries that don’t sanction Russia, they commonly source parts from sellers subject to restrictions imposed by Washington, Brussels or London.
“Sanctions are designed to capture not just direct supply to Russia of prohibited goods but also indirect supply,” said Francis Bond, who works on corporate crime for the Macfarlanes LLP law firm in London. “In these sorts of situations, companies are not off the hook because willful blindness is not tolerated.”
He was speaking generally and not about these specific transactions.
Russia’s 46 carriers had 838 passenger jets in service as of April 30, according to analytics firm Cirium Ltd. More than half — or 460 planes — were Airbus or Boeing models. These numbers have stayed relatively stable since 2023, with the exception of the newer A320neo family of narrowbody planes that are increasingly being grounded.
Older Planes Fly On, While Newer Jets Face Groundings
Share of active planes in each aircraft family
Source: Cirium
Note: Data are based on satellite-tracked flight activity for passenger jets registered with Russian airlines in these three narrowbody aircraft families. Planes with at least one flight in a given month are marked as active. Inactive aircraft may be temporarily parked, in storage, retired or written off.
Representatives for both planemakers said they were abiding by sanctions and not doing any business with Russian airlines.
In early 2022, Boeing stopped providing parts, maintenance and technical support for customers and maintenance service providers in Russia, a spokesperson said in an email. The company continues to adhere to US sanctions and global laws and regulations.
Airbus said it follows US and EU export controls, does due diligence on customers and tracks movements of parts. The company can also specify that a particular part can only be used by a particular airline in a particular plane.
“There is no legal way that genuine aircraft parts, documentation and services can get to Russian or any embargoed carriers,” Justin Dubon, a spokesperson for the Toulouse, France-based manufacturer, said in an email.
Yet the data show that at least some do. The most detailed records come from the Indian government, a major buyer of Russian oil and military hardware.
They show that one of the most active aviation exporters to Russia is MEC, run by retired naval officer Ajay Kumar. After the Ukraine war began, its export business ballooned.
MEC operates from a 12th-floor office at an industrial park in Kochi, referred to as the Queen of the Arabian Sea for its port history. The company’s customer list includes the navy, Air India and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
“Our ability to say ‘yes’ when others often say ‘no’ is what sets us apart from our competitors,” MEC says on its website.
By far, the firm’s biggest exports were the Rossiya deals for CFM56-5B engines, according to Indian records. Kumar, MEC’s chairman and managing director, said the company has done business with Russian entities for years, procuring spare parts for fighter jets used by the Indian military.
After Bloomberg News interviewed him about the Rossiya sales, Kumar said the company spoke with India’s Directorate General of Foreign Trade about the issue and was changing its policy.
“We were not fully aware of the repercussions,” he said in a WhatsApp message. “Following their guidance and considering the evolving sensitivities, we have since completely stopped doing business with Russia.”
Aman Aviation approached VAS several months before the engine transactions, saying it was setting up a leasing platform for India and required about 10 engines, according to a person familiar with the discussions.
Aman Aviation’s owner is Rajendra Johri, and its registered office is the same address as his apartment north of Mumbai. His wife said he wasn’t home when a reporter knocked on the door two weeks ago but she would pass on the message.
The office listed on its website is in an industrial park with a plastics recycling business, realtors and a textiles firm. A crooked sign hangs next to the front door underneath tentacles of electrical wires.
There were fewer than a dozen workers in Aman Aviation’s office that day, and they said Johri wasn’t there. He didn’t call after the reporter’s visit, and he didn’t respond to emails seeking comment.
Even though India doesn’t sanction Russia, a VAS compliance spokesperson said the engine exports were “in blatant violation” of the sales agreements. Such contract clauses are required by the EU, Bond said.
VAS said it was unaware of the shipments to Russia until being told by Bloomberg News.
VAS has since made the appropriate disclosures to US and European authorities, and the engines’ seller, FTAI Aviation Ltd.; sent a legal notice to its customer saying it reserves the right to sue; and bolstered its “Know Your Customer” program and training, the compliance spokesperson said.
Aman Aviation subsequently told VAS it wasn’t aware of MEC’s intent with the engines, and as a result was taking steps to withdraw its business relationships with MEC, according to a person familiar.
A spokesman for New York-based FTAI said its contracts with Vallair Asset Solutions required any transactions to comply with sanctions. FTAI didn’t know the engines would eventually end up in Russia, he said.
CFM is a joint venture between Safran SA and GE Aerospace. Safran didn’t reply to requests for comment. A spokesman for GE Aerospace declined to comment.
Another prominent company in India’s trade records is Chandsara Aviation Pvt. Ltd. in Meerut, about 85 kilometers (53 miles) northeast of New Delhi. The firm was founded in 2023, after the war started.
Chandsara’s sole export customer is Russia, with shipments totaling more than $10 million, according to Big Trade Data. It did business with Aeroflot and entities under the private S7 Group, namely S 7 Engineering and Siberia Airlines.
Among the most valuable shipments were two modules — designed for CFM engines — sold to Siberia Airlines for $810,000 each. Those were sourced from Miami-based AMP Aero Services LLC, which has an office in New Delhi.
AMP Aero’s chief executive officer, Ambalik Agarwal, declined to comment.
In December, Chandsara imported a legacy CFM56-5A engine, which uses older technology, from LogAir LLC, a Doral, Florida-based company, for $3.6 million. The supplier didn’t reply to requests for comment via email or telephone.
About two weeks later, another Indian company, Shreegee Pvt. Ltd., shipped the part — which is designed for the A320 — to S7 for $5.75 million. The US in 2024 sanctioned a business called Shreegee Impex Pvt. Ltd. — which shares a logo, address and multiple directors with the other company — for supplying Russia with hundreds of dual-use items, including aviation parts.
India Traders Sell Plane Parts to Russia at Steep Markups
Source: Bloomberg analysis of customs records compiled by Big Trade Data
“The illegal purchase and import of engines into Russia remains widespread,” said Laneckij, who was speaking generally. He cited estimates of as many as 50 engines a year.
Chandsara’s address is in a three-story, older building plastered with signs for an eatery, financial services office and pharmaceuticals company, among others. A library and massage parlor also are tenants.
A recent visit found no signage for Chandsara. Random inquiries led to Praveen Tyagi, who resigned as a Chandsara director in 2024 but is still a manager. He’s also a director for Shreegee.
Tyagi agreed to be interviewed for this story but then declined to comment.
Aeroflot, S7 and the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency — commonly known as Rosaviatsia — didn’t respond to emails seeking comments on the engine sales and how airlines maintain their Airbus and Boeing fleets.
MEC, Chandsara and Shreegee are only a few links in Russia’s supply chain. China, which endeavors to be a powerhouse in aviation manufacturing, exported at least $961 million of aircraft parts to Russia from March 2022 to February 2026.
That’s more than quadruple the amount from the same length of time before the invasion, according to Trade Data Monitor.
Aircraft Parts Exported to Russia Take Off
Value of components shipped from key trade partners
Source: Customs data compiled by Trade Data Monitor
Note: Data show reported trade across four Harmonized System Codes most relevant to aircraft parts for commercial aviation. Monthly data for Kyrgyzstan on the TDM platform is only available from 2020 onward.
If Boeing and Airbus are prohibited from servicing their jets, then how are Russian airlines able to keep them aloft?
The manufacturers maintained some of their largest overseas engineering bases in Russia before the invasion. When they exited the country, their sophisticated facilities and pools of highly skilled workers remained in place, Laneckij said.
“It is important to remember that Russia had a relatively well-developed aviation industry before the war,” he said.
Russia subsequently invested in its maintenance, repair and overhaul infrastructure to become more self-reliant.
S7 Technics expanded its Sheremetyevo-based engine overhaul plant for Airbus A320s and Boeing 737s in 2025, according to Interfax. It now has stations in five Russian time zones with customers including Aeroflot, S7 Airlines and Rossiya, according to its website.
The company completed repairs on 100 engines last year, Aviation Week reported in January.
Last year, Rosaviatsia certified Aeroflot to fix engines used on Boeing and Airbus planes in-house so they didn’t have to be sent abroad anymore. The airline had 116 Airbus and 59 Boeing passenger jets in total as of April 30, according to Cirium data.
“The number of engineers in Russia has increased by at least 30%,” said Andrey Patrakov, founder of RunAvia, a private flight safety and certification service. “These are golden times for the engineering support sector.”
And if the necessary fixes are beyond the scope of Russian capabilities, those parts are shipped abroad clandestinely under the guise of being the property of companies in Turkey, the UAE, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Laneckij said. To make it back into Russia, repair shops frequently sell to “one-day companies,” he said.
While the shadow supply chain currently eases the pain of sanctions, it’s not a long-term remedy, experts said.
Passenger capacity is approaching its peak, and large-scale fleet renewal through bulk buying isn’t possible. That means planes will keep aging and piling on flight hours without replacements.
As Russian carriers push jets to their limits, they’ll require more maintenance, and friendly suppliers won’t be able to keep up with the demand for parts. Aeroflot said its maintenance expenses jumped 19% to 68 billion rubles last year.
Last year, Russia asked the US to let it buy Boeing aircraft using money from frozen state assets once there’s a ceasefire in Ukraine, Bloomberg News reported. Boeing and the US State Department declined to comment at the time.
In the meantime, some planes are being parked and cannibalized for parts to keep other jets in service, said George Voloshin, a Paris-based sanctions expert who tracks Russia. The A320neo family models are especially vulnerable, partly because of faults with engines made by RTX Corp.’s Pratt & Whitney.
Most of Russia’s A320neo Family Jets Didn’t Fly in April
Flights per month since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022
Source: Cirium
Note: Data show satellite-tracked flight activity for Airbus A320neo family passenger jets registered with Russian airlines.
Western allies keep piling the sanctions on Russia, with the EU adopting its 20th package and the UK targeting crypto networks. Even so, the near-term outlook for domestic airlines remains positive, Burilkov said.
Although Aman Aviation said it was cutting ties with MEC, and MEC said it stopped selling to Russia, there are countless other suppliers willing to keep doing business, especially at the inflated prices Moscow is prepared to pay.
“Closing these pipelines is something that we cannot realistically expect to happen,” Burilkov said. “I don’t see how sanctions would truly be able to affect this sector in a dramatic way in the coming decade.”Edited by Michael TigheMichael OvaskaDavid Ingold With assistance from Stephanie BakerAndy LinAdvait PalepuLeen Al-RashdanSiddharth PhilipAndre TartarTom Fevrier Illustration by 731, Source: Alamy x 2