AI TAKEAWAYS
- Six of Europe’s largest economies are coordinating outside formal EU institutions, signalling a shift toward a “two-speed Europe.”
- The initiative focuses on capital markets, defence, payments systems, and strategic autonomy from the US.
- This process predates Trump’s return but aligns with growing transatlantic uncertainty.
- The move raises questions about EU cohesion, democratic legitimacy, and institutional relevance.
- 2026 may prove a turning point for whether Europe integrates further — or fragments strategically.
Amid the global storm of geopolitical developments — and as Donald Trump’s “armadas” openly threaten direct military intervention in Iran — a seemingly modest European meeting passed almost unnoticed. The so-called “meeting of six” barely registered in the news cycle.
It should not have.
Six of the European Union’s largest economies — Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands — met with an agenda that remains deliberately vague in detail but strikingly clear in intent. This was not a routine coordination meeting. It was a signal.
German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, who announced the gathering, described its purpose as advancing policies that underpin Europe’s “sovereign capacity.” Not the sovereignty of the European Union, notably — but of Europe itself. The distinction matters.
Only days earlier, speaking at an event organised by Die Welt, Klingbeil had openly argued for a “two-speed Europe.” That language, long considered politically toxic after the eurozone crisis, has returned — and this time from the heart of Europe’s governing establishment.
Why speak of multiple speeds when the EU and the monetary union were built precisely to avoid fragmentation? Klingbeil’s answer was blunt: some priorities are too urgent to wait for unanimous consensus among 27 member states.
Those priorities are revealing. They include accelerating the Capital Markets Union; creating a European payment system independent of the United States; fast-tracking defence investment; and charting a more autonomous future for the euro itself.
The six also discussed access to strategic reserves — emergency stockpiles, rare earths, and critical raw materials. Energy dependence was not officially mentioned, but it would strain credulity to believe that Europe’s post-Russia reliance on US energy supplies was not central to the conversation. Officials familiar with the process suggest it was.
Crucially, this initiative did not emerge overnight. Coordination among these six economies has been quietly maturing since at least 2023, through lower-level meetings and technical exchanges. In other words, this is not a reactive response to Trump, Iran, or Greenland. It is a pre-Trump strategy that now appears eerily aligned with the new geopolitical reality.
That raises an uncomfortable question: why are Europe’s largest economies acting outside the EU’s formal institutional framework — the Commission, the ECB, the Eurogroup, even the European Parliament — on issues that sit squarely at the top of those bodies’ agendas?
Klingbeil offered a candid explanation, and none of his counterparts contradicted him. “We are giving momentum,” he said. “Others can join. What matters is strengthening our competitiveness and our defence capacity.”
Translated into plain language: we move first; others may follow — or not.
This is, in effect, a return to differentiated integration. Those unable or unwilling to move at the same pace remain where they are, while the core advances. The structure is simple, and deliberately exclusionary.
At first glance, this looks like a rerun of the old “two-speed Europe” debate — one that once threatened to relegate Greece, Italy, and much of southern Europe to a permanent second tier. But the context has changed profoundly.
Trump’s strategic worldview has already made clear that a united Europe is seen not as an ally but as an anomaly — even a mistake. The US National Security Strategy openly favours a Europe of sovereign nation-states rather than a cohesive political bloc.
That vision is echoed in Trump’s overt support for nationalist and far-right parties across Europe — from Germany and Hungary to France, eastern Europe, and especially Italy. Under Giorgia Meloni, Italy — alongside Hungary — is already viewed in Washington as sympathetic to this re-nationalised European order.
Against this backdrop, the “meeting of six” takes on a different meaning. It may represent Europe’s most serious attempt yet to pre-empt strategic marginalisation — to consolidate power before external pressures force fragmentation on less favourable terms.
Whether this becomes a vehicle for deeper integration among the willing, or the embryo of a fractured Europe, remains an open question. What is certain is that the era of procedural patience is over.
As 2026 unfolds amid rising global instability, this quiet alignment among Europe’s largest economies may prove to be a decisive moment — one that reshapes the continent’s political and economic architecture long before the public realises what is happening.
